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Abstract 
 
In-game purchases, virtual currency, content 
design for heterogeneous consumers and strong 
competition are key challenges for mobile game 
providers. This study addresses determination of 
optimal game design strategies for game providers in 
the presence of heterogeneous players and copycat 
competitors. Moreover, this paper incorporates 
pricing of virtual goods/currency into the Free-to-
Play (F2P) mobile game design via a duopoly model 
and characterizes the optimal strategies for game 
providers in terms of pricing of virtual 
goods/currency and the game challenge level. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The digital game industry is growing at a very 
fast rate bringing in $83.6 Billion in 2014 and was 
expected to increase by 19.1% to $99.6 Billion in 
2016 [6]. The way digital games are played has 
evolved during the past few years as the sales of 
mobile devices have increased dramatically. While 
PC gaming and console gaming are still leaders in the 
way that digital games are played, the mobile gaming 
segment has been steadily increasing with 966 
million players worldwide [12], bringing in revenue 
of $34.8 billion. Top mobile games can be very 
successful in generating significant revenue, 
Supercells games’ Clash of Clans and Hay Day 
generated $2.4 million a day [17]. The dominant way 
for mobile games to earn revenue has been shifting 
from the traditional pay outright for the game to a 
free to play model, which earns revenue through 
micro transactions. 
The main difference between mobile F2P and 
console games is that there is no free trial for players; 
instead players download the entire game for free [3]. 
Thus, there are no barriers for players to download 
and start playing an F2P mobile game. Players can 
still play the entire game without spending real 
money; however, many players are willing to buy 
virtual goods/currency to speed up their game 
progression. In today’s mobile game market, F2P 
game developers prefer as many players as possible 
present in the game due to network effect, because 
most F2P games are massively multiplayer online 
games. Therefore, these mobile games are totally free 
to download without any free-trial period. 
This study focuses on F2P mobile games 
generating revenue from selling virtual currency (i.e. 
diamonds, crystals that can be used to purchase 
armor, equipment or faster leveling in game) or 
virtual goods. In-app purchases will be the number 
one revenue source for mobile apps while paid apps 
will account for 37.8% and ad based revenue will 
account for 14% at the end of 2017 [11]. Therefore, 
our study only focuses on revenue generated by 
selling virtual currency/goods in F2P mobile games. 
This study’s main contribution is providing a 
framework for a game provider facing strong 
competition and heterogeneous players. 
This study incorporates pricing of virtual 
goods/currency into the F2P mobile game design via 
a duopoly model and characterizes the optimal 
strategies for game providers in terms of pricing of 
virtual goods/currency and the game challenge level. 
The purpose of our monopoly and duopoly models is 
to explore strategies and provide managerial insights 
for the original game providers in pricing of virtual 
goods and setting challenge level of the F2P mobile 
games. In the duopoly model, we investigate a 
commonly observed practice, where the copycat 
game providers compete against the original game 
providers through duplicating the game mechanism 
of the original game. We reveal the optimal pricing 
and game design strategies for both the original and 
copycat game providers engaged in a duopoly 
competition. In addition, we show that there should 
be a reasonable first-mover advantage for the original 
game provider to create original games. 
 We review the literature in Section 2; then, our 
modeling approach and results are presented in 
Sections 3. We conclude our study with a discussion, 
managerial implications for game providers and 
future research directions in Section 4. 
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2. Literature Review  
 
Regarding current research in digital games, most 
of the literature focuses on traditional computer and 
console games, studies embracing virtual currency, 
game design and competition among F2P game 
providers are very limited. The goal of this literature 
review is to show that this paper fills a gap in mobile 
game (specifically F2P games) design incorporating 
pricing of virtual goods/currency for both monopoly 
and duopoly cases. In a recent article, Guo et al. [7] 
study a monopoly game provider’s problem of selling 
virtual currency to players who enjoy leisure and earn 
virtual currency. They conclude that decreasing the 
virtual currency price and increasing the number of 
virtual goods would improve game providers’ 
revenue. Finneran and Zhang [6] provide a review of 
promises and challenges of studying flow, a 
psychological state, in computer-mediated 
environments and cautions researchers to investigate 
hidden assumptions of theories in other disciplines. 
Agarwal and Karahanna [1] use a structural 
equation analysis to examine cognitive absorption of 
information technology use based on temporal 
dissociation, focused immersion, heightened 
enjoyment, control, and curiosity. They propose that 
playfulness and personal innovativeness are key 
determinates of cognitive absorption. Liu et al. [13] 
argue that competition is the key factor of game 
design that should be incorporated into organizational 
activity games such as employee training games. 
This paper only focuses on F2P games on mobile 
devices. Regarding game satisfaction and virtual 
currency in F2P games, researchers have been 
studying motivations of playing the games and 
impacts of virtual currency and promotions. Yee [18] 
presents that achievement, social environment and 
immersion components are main reasons for playing 
video games. Moreover, Ryan et al. [15] demonstrate 
that game enjoyment; autonomy, competence and 
relatedness are important factors for intentions to 
play video games. Besides players’ intentions to play 
these video games, Moon et al. [14] propose 
ownership-enhancing and socialization-enhancing 
strategies to improve player commitment in playing 
the game. 
Considering virtual currency and promotions in 
video games, Guo and Barnes [8] model consumer’s 
behavior buying virtual currency via a mixture of 
new constructs and established theories, including 
theory of planned behavior, technology acceptance 
model, trust theory and unified theory of acceptance 
and use of technology. Additionally, Hamari and 
Lehdonvirta [10] focus on marketing of virtual goods 
for F2Ps due to untapped potential for marketing of 
virtual goods and Hamari [9] investigates purchase 
behavior for virtual goods in three F2P game 
environments: social networking, first-person shooter 
and social virtual world games. 
 This paper examines micro transactions in digital 
games, specifically in F2P mobile games. This study 
is positioned in the interface of information systems, 
e-commerce, and economics literature. This study 
also characterizes the optimal strategies for game 
providers in terms of pricing of virtual 
goods/currency, game challenge level and threat from 
copycat game providers. 
 
3. Duopoly Model 
 
Cloning is as old as the video game industry 
itself. In the mobile game market, the problem of 
copycat games is an even more staggering problem 
due to familiarity with the popular games and an 
increased chance of capturing the attention of players 
(e.g., Pokémon Go vs. Citymon Go, Clash of Clans 
vs. Game of War, Super Mario Bros vs Super Max, 
2048 vs. Threes etc.) [2]. With a seemingly infinite 
number of games on mobile platforms, it is quite 
common to see many games which are extremely 
similar to each other, particularly when you consider 
the features of the gameplay mechanics. Analyzing a 
duopoly case in our problem coincides with the 
copycat problem of the F2P mobile game market. In 
our model, there are two game providers, A and B, 
whose F2P games are competing for the same 
market. Thus, the game providers need to make their 
decisions not only to capture market share and 
generate revenue from players buying virtual 
goods/currency, but also to consider the strategy of 
the other game providers. 
In mobile games, we observe that the amount of 
virtual goods purchased by consumers vary from 
player to player. To model the “free to play” virtual 
game scenario, we first require that consumers be 
heterogeneous in their gaming challenge level 
preferences. Let θ represents individual player’s 
preference about the challenge level of the game, 
which is assumed to be distributed uniformly 
between 0 and 1. Hence, the population density is 
normalized at 1. Players are heterogeneous in θ, this 
follows from the classic Shapiro’s [16] treatment of 
consumers’ heterogeneous tastes for product 
qualities. Players may consume different amount of 
virtual goods/currency depending on the actual game 
challenge level relative to individual player’s 
personal preference. This is also the departing point 
for our model from the existing literature (e.g., [7, 
8]), where players are often assumed to consume 
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either zero or one quantity of the game’s virtual 
goods/currency. A mobile game player may not play 
the game at all if the game is deemed as too difficult 
for a beginner or too easy for a more experienced 
player. Hence, the actual game challenge level has an 
impact on the potential market size for the game. 
Therefore, we treat the actual game challenge level γ 
as one of the two decision variables of the game 
providers in addition to the unit price p for the virtual 
goods/currency.   
The game challenge level will cause disutility to a 
player in both directions when the game challenge 
level set by the provider and player’s preference on 
the game challenge level are not equal to each other. 
When a game fails to meet a player’s preconception, 
either by being too easy or too challenging for that 
player, it often causes frustration to the player’s game 
experience. Lowering the challenge level to “Easy” 
can feel humiliating to a self-titled “hardcore” player, 
as raising the challenge level to “Hard” would be 
unthinkable to a “casual” one. When the game 
challenge level is higher than a player’s preferred 
challenge level, the player may choose to purchase a 
certain amount of virtual goods/currency to align the 
game’s challenge level with the player’s preferred 
challenge level and therefore improve the player’s 
utility. Meanwhile, if the game challenge level is 
lower than a player’s preferred challenge level, then 
the player will not purchase any virtual 
goods/currency as doing so will only decrease a 
player’s utility. 
Without loss of generality, we assume game 
provider B creates a copycat game of provider A; 
thus, the problem is modeled as a three-stage 
Stackelberg game. In Stage 1, the original game 
provider A announces the game challenge level γA 
and the unit price for the virtual goods/currency pA 
for its game. In stage 2, the copycat announces game 
challenge level γB and the unit price for the virtual 
goods/currency pB for its game observing the 
strategies adopted by provider A. In stage 3, players 
decide which game to play and choose the amount of 
virtual goods/currency GA and GB to purchase. The 
duopoly case is solved by backward induction. 
 
3.1. Player’s Decision in Stage 3 
  
By backward induction, first we solve the player’s 
decision problem in Stage 3 assuming the game 
challenge levels (both original and copycat games) 
and the unit prices for the virtual goods/currency are 
already observed by players. A player’s utility 
function has the following forms depending on the 
choice of the F2P game, UA=V-c(γA-θ-GA)2-pAGA or 
UB=V-s-c(γB-θ-GB)2-pBGB, as s is the discounted 
utility for the copycat game. 
We assume a penalty s > 0 for the gross utility of 
the copycat game. This is because the original game 
often offers a larger player base and is deemed by 
players as more valuable due to positive network 
effects. Furthermore, most F2P mobile games are 
multiplayer, there are already more players playing 
the original game when the copycat game is 
introduced. Hence, the copycat game provider will 
suffer for not being first to market. In our analysis, 
we also choose to focus on the duopoly competition 
between the original game and the copycat when the 
market is fully covered. An original game with large 
gross utility often enjoys an initial release success, 
which not only attracts a lot of players but also draws 
copycat competitors due to its popularity. Hence, in 
F2P games if an original game is indeed very popular 
then a copycat game is almost guaranteed to show up, 
hence a duopoly competitor. 
Since UA and UB are concave in GA and GB 
respectively, the optimal amount of virtual 
goods/currency purchased by the player is found by 
solving the first order conditions and the optimal 
solutions are GA*=γA-θ-(pA/2c) and GB*=γB-θ-(pB/2c). 
Setting GA*=0 and GB*=0, we find the indifference 
points (θUA and θUB) for players purchasing virtual 
goods/currency as θUA=γA-(pA/2c) and θUB=γB-(pB/2c). 
 
3.2. Copycat’s Decision in Stage 2 
 
The copycat game provider’s objective is to 
optimize its revenue using both its game’s challenge 
level and the pricing of the game’s virtual 
goods/currency. If the copycat provider sets the unit 
price for its virtual goods higher than the original 
game provider, then the duopoly game is expected to 
be dominated by the original game provider. This is 
because players already perceive the copycat game as 
the less valuable product (due to the discount factor 
s), if the virtual goods in copycat game are more 
expensive, players would have no incentive to play 
the copycat game. Therefore, we choose to focus on 
the case where pB≤pA.  
Considering to ensure that the copycat game 
provider’s revenue is positive, there exists an upper 
bound such that pB< 2cγB-√(pA2-4cpA γA+4c(s+cγB2 )). 
Note that this upper bound on pB is smaller than the 
lower bound on pA. Therefore, the price set on the 
virtual goods/currency sold by the original game 
provider is always going to be greater than the 
copycat game provider i.e., pA>pB, which is 
consistent with our previous assumption. The copycat 
game must offer virtual goods/currency at a cheaper 
price than the original game to have positive revenue. 
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Failing to provide cheaper virtual goods/currency 
will result in players choosing to participate only in 
the original game. 
According to our analysis, the optimal price and 
challenge level for the copycat provider depends on 
the original game provider’s challenge level and 
price. The copycat provider’s optimal price will be 
lower than the original game provider’s price; hence, 
this will allow the copycat to attract players. There 
exists an optimal game challenge level for the 
copycat provider in response to the original game 
providers’ strategies set in Stage 1.  
 
3.3. Original Game Provider’s Decision in 
Stage 1 
 
In Stage 1, the original game provider A sets its 
price and challenge level with the expectation that a 
copycat game will show up in Stage 2. The revenue 
function of the original game provider is derived 
based on the targeted market between [θi, θUA]. The 
original game provider’s optimal pA and γA can be 
found by substituting the optimal pB* and γB* (found 
in Stage 2) into RA and then we solve the revenue 
maximization problem for the original game 
provider. 
The upper bound of pA is derived based on the 
constraint that 0<θi<1 and the lower bound of pA is 
derived based on the constraint that θUA> θi. Solving 
the above maximization problem, we obtain the 
optimal unit price for the original game provider such 
that pA*= (2/15) (7c-2√(c2+15cs)). Since the revenue 
function RA is convex in γA, the interior optimal 
solution of γA* do not exist. As a result, we analyze 
the optimal γA* as well as the optimal unit price pA* 
numerically. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Change of the Orginal Game 
Provider’s Revenue Function with respect to γA 
 
 
Figure 2. The Change of the Orginal Game 
Provider’s Revenue Function with respect to pA 
 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the change of the 
original game provider’s revenue function with 
respect to γA and pA. We set c=0.35, pA=0.11 s=0.1 in 
Figure 1 and c=0.35, γA=1, s=0.1 in Figure 2. The 
revenue function RA as shown in Figure 1 is convex 
in γA. Starting approximately at γA=0.33, the original 
game provider may choose to raise the game 
challenge level to increase its overall revenue. 
Moreover, raising the game challenge level to the 
highest value leads to the possible maximized 
revenue. This indicates the optimal solution for the 
game challenge level is found at γA*=1. In another 
word, it is in the original game provider’s best 
interest to offer the most challenging game in the 
duopoly setting. Furthermore, if the original game 
provider does not set γA to the upper bound value, the 
copycat provider will steal market share by cutting 
the price of its virtual goods/currency. That is not a 
desirable situation for the original game provider; 
thus, the challenge level γA should be the maximum 
feasible value based on previously set parameters. 
Also illustrated in Figure 2, although the revenue 
function RA is not strictly concave in pA, the optimal 
value for the unit price pA that maximizes the original 
game provider’s revenue does exist (approximately at 
pA = 0.11) in the shown example, which is consistent 
with the closed form solution presented previously, 
pA*= (2/15) (7c-2√(c2+15cs)). 
 
3.4. Impact of First-Mover Advantage, s 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the discount 
factor s on the revenues of the two game providers. In 
Figure 3, we set c=0.35, pA=0.11 and γA=1, the red 
line represents the original game provider’s revenue 
and the black line represents the copycat game 
provider’s revenue. 
𝛾" 
𝑅" 
pA 
RA 
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Figure 3. The Critical Threshold Value of the 
Discount factor s that Provide First Mover Advantage 
 
As shown in Figure 3, when the first-mover 
advantage is small, the revenue of the copycat game 
provider’s revenue is higher than the original game 
provider. If the discount factor value is known to the 
original game provider beforehand, then the original 
game provider is better off as a copycat. Thus, no 
original game would be introduced to the market at 
all. The discount factor or penalty s reflects a first-
mover advantage for the original game provider. To 
ensure that there is a healthy market in which original 
games will continue to be produced, the industry can 
examine the use of regulations. For example, by 
regulating the release time of games, the industry can 
potentially ensure that a reasonable high first-mover 
advantage and prevent market failure. 
While this study does not recommend regulation, 
it’s potentially in the industries’ best interest to 
examine possible use of regulations to sustain a 
healthy mobile game market. The larger the first 
mover advantage the more incentive for the original 
game provider to develop brand new games. The 
original game provider may pursue legal methods 
through copyright or patent protection to secure a 
penalty from the copycat provider so that the 
discount factor is big enough to provide necessary 
incentives. But often, the copycat game only clones 
the gameplay and mechanics of the original game, 
which is not copyrightable or enforceable. Thus, the 
original game provider should consider investing 
more in the content of the game so that it will take 
longer and make it harder for the copycat provider to 
clone. By releasing the game first into the market, the 
original game provider also enjoys the first mover 
advantage in building up its play base. In choosing 
F2P mobile games, players often favor the game with 
bigger player base. From the copycat game 
providers’ perspective, it is in their best interest to 
reduce the first mover advantage received by the 
original game provider. Copycat game provider may 
achieve this by releasing the cloning version of the 
game soon after the release of the original game 
before the original game builds up dominated player 
base. This practice is often observed in real world, 
when a popular mobile game is released a copycat 
game tends to follow quickly. For example, Clash of 
Clans was released in August 2012 and less than a 
year later Game of War was released in July 2013. 
When comparing the revenue of the two games in 
2015, Clash of Clans came out ahead with $1.345 
billion while Game of Ware made $799 million [4]. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Revenue generation in F2P games is a 
challenging task for game providers due to 
heterogeneous consumers and strong competition 
from copycat games. In this study, we characterize 
optimal strategies for a monopoly game provider and 
for both the original and copycat game providers in a 
duopoly case. 
In the duopoly model, we focus on popular F2P 
games with rich content. We show that there exists a 
pair of optimal solutions for the copycat provider’s 
decision problem. To maximize revenue, both the 
optimal game challenge level and the optimal unit 
price for the virtual goods/currency should be set by 
copycat provider in observation of original game 
provider’s strategy. It is also shown that there is an 
upper bound on the price of the copycat game 
provider, which regulates the unit price for virtual 
goods/currency set by copycat provider should be 
cheaper than that of the original game. Regarding the 
original game provider’s strategy, we show that an 
optimal unit price for the virtual goods/currency does 
exist for the original game and the original game 
provider should set the challenge level of the game to 
the highest value possible to maximize its expected 
revenue anticipating copycat provider will cut its 
price in the duopoly setting. Moreover, we conclude 
that there should be a reasonable first mover 
advantage (in the form of discounted value to copycat 
games) for the original providers in order for them to 
create original games.  
This study is not without its limitation. Although 
it integrates pricing decisions with F2P game design 
and heterogonous players, our model does not take 
players adaptive behaviors into consideration. Players 
may improve their playing skills hence modify their 
preferred game challenge levels as they become more 
skilled with gameplay mechanics, which in turn 
?̂? 
RA > RB, the original game 
provider now has incentive 
to become the first mover. 
Copycat provider therefore 
has a game to “copy” in 
stage 2  𝑠 
𝑅 𝑅&  𝑅" 
RB > RA, game providers 
have no incentive to 
become the first mover in 
stage 1, hence there will be 
no game for players to 
play.  
Page 1354
could affect game providers’ strategies. Moreover, 
our model assumes the discount factor is the same for 
all players, but in actuality it might be different. In 
addition to this assumption, the duopoly case analysis 
is limited to popular F2P games with rich content. 
For future research, it will be interesting to expand 
the model to include players with multiple accounts 
for the same game and players playing both games in 
the duopoly case. 
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